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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Everett C. Gottardi appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.  On appeal, Gottardi 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 Boise Police Officer Kevin Wittmuss, a “task officer” for the “U.S. 
Marshal’s Task Force,” was surveilling a residence late one afternoon looking for 
Janelle Green because she was wanted on a warrant out of Nevada “for two 
controlled substance [delivery] charges.”  (Tr.1, p.8, Ls.1-4, p.9, Ls.6-15, p.10, 
Ls.10-17, p.14, Ls.4-8.)  Green was listed on Nevada’s “top ten most wanted 
females out of that jurisdiction.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-11; see also p.9, Ls.15-16, p.42, 
Ls.23-24.)  As Officer Wittmuss and another officer, Terry Phillips, watched the 
residence,2 they saw Gottardi come outside for a few minutes before going back 
in the house.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-8.)  When Gottardi first came out, he “walked 
around the immediate area,” took “some things out of the back” of Green’s truck, 
“walked over to a dumpster,” and then “walked back into the house.”  (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.17-24.)  At that time, Officer Wittmuss observed Gottardi drinking a beer.  (Tr., 
p.11, Ls.21-23.)   
                                            
1 There are three transcripts included in the record on appeal.  All references to 
“Tr.” are to the transcript of the suppression hearing conducted on April 1, 2015.  
 
2 Officer Wittmuss described the residence as part of a “row of houses,” like 
duplexes or four-plexes.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.18-23.) 
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“A short time later,” Gottardi “came back out and proceeded walking” toward a 
“convenience store located to the south.”  (Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.3.)  Officer 
Wittmuss noticed that Gottardi’s behavior when he was outside was a little 
unusual because Gottardi appeared to be conducting “counter surveillance,” like 
he was looking to see “if there were any officers in the area” or “looking for 
someone to arrive.”  (Tr., p.12, L.4 – p.13, L.9.) 
 While Gottardi was gone, Officer Wittmuss saw Green come outside 
“really quick.”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.8-13; see also p.29, L.19 – p.30, L.6.)  
Approximately ten minutes after Gottardi left on foot toward the convenience 
store, he returned as a passenger in a car.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-20.)  Rather than 
drop Gottardi off at the door to Green’s residence, the driver dropped Gottardi off 
“out in the street” at the entrance to the complex.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.17-22.)  Because 
Green was not outside long enough to approach her while Gottardi was gone, 
Officer Wittmuss decided to go to the door at the same time as Gottardi “to 
potentially make [Green] believe” that Officer Wittmuss was with Gottardi so 
Green would open the door if Gottardi knocked first.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-25, p.29, 
L.22 – p.30, L.6.) 
 “Gottardi walked up to the front door, [and] knocked and [Officer 
Wittmuss] was immediately right there.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-14.)  Officer Wittmuss 
identified himself to Gottardi and told him he was looking for Green, but “got no 
response immediately from” Gottardi, so Officer Wittmuss knocked on the door 
and, “within seconds,” Green “opened the front door” and “things escalated fairly 
quickly.”  (Tr., p.16, Ls.12-21.)  Green denied she was the person identified in 
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the warrant and “tried to shut the door,” but Officer Wittmuss “grabbed onto her.”  
(Tr., p.16, L.23 – p.17, L.1.)   
 While Officer Wittmuss was making contact with Green, Gottardi was 
“standing about a foot off to [Officer Wittmuss’s] left” where he had originally 
moved to when Officer Wittmuss asked him to step back so he could knock on 
Green’s door.  (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-9, 16-23, p.34, Ls.16-22, p.53, L.5 – p.54, L.11.)  
After two other officers got to the door to assist, Officer Wittmuss turned his 
attention to Gottardi and asked him if he had any weapons.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.5-7.)  
Gottardi said he had a “pocket knife” at which point Officer Wittmuss informed 
Gottardi that he was going to “pat search” him.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.17-23.)  Officer 
Wittmuss found a “folding knife tucked into [Gottardi’s] belt”; the knife had a four-
inch blade and “was rigged just to grab onto the handle and flip it open and an 
immediate weapon would be present.”  (Tr., p.21, Ls.8-13, p.23, Ls.6-8.)  As 
Officer Wittmuss continued to pat search Gottardi, he felt a “hard object” in 
Gottardi’s pocket and asked, “Hey, what’s that?  Is that a pipe?”  (Tr., p.21, L.24 
– p.22, L.2.)  Gottardi said it was and when Officer Wittmuss asked if he had 
“anything else on his person,” Gottardi said he had “a little baggy.”  (Tr., p.22, 
Ls.3-4.)  Officer Wittmuss asked, “Is that shake or what is it?” and Gottardi told 
Officer Wittmuss it was methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.5-6.)  “As soon as 
[Gottardi] admitted that he had a pipe and the methamphetamine on his person,” 
Officer Wittmuss “placed him under arrest and into handcuffs.”  (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-
14.)   
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 The state charged Gottardi with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.6-7, 37-38, 46-47.)  Gottardi filed a 
motion to suppress and supporting brief, contending the officers “illegally 
detained, frisked and searched him” without “reasonable articulable suspicion 
that he had committed or was about to commit a crime or was armed and 
dangerous.”  (R., pp.80, 84.)  After a hearing, the district court denied Gottardi’s 
motion, ruling that any detention was lawful and that Officer Wittmuss had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Gottardi.  (Tr., p.82, L.9 – p.93, L.15; 
see also R., p.90.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Gottardi reserved the right to 
challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal, Gottardi pled guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine, and the state dismissed the paraphernalia 
charge.  (R., pp.92-100; see generally 4/15/2015 Tr.)  The court imposed a 
unified seven-year sentence, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  






Gottardi states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gottardi’s motion 
to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Gottardi failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
presented supports the district court’s conclusions that any detention was lawful 






Gottardi Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Gottardi challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that 
“Officer Wittmuss lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that [he] either had 
been or was about to be engaged in criminal activity at the time [Officer 
Wittmuss] detained him.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  Gottardi alternatively argues 
that, “even if the initial detention was lawful, Officer Wittmuss lacked a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that [he] was armed and presently dangerous” 
such that the pat search violated his “Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  Gottardi’s arguments fail.  
Correct application of the law to the facts supports the district court’s 
determinations that any detention was lawful and the frisk was supported by 
reasonable articulable suspicion.  The district court’s order denying Gottardi’s 
motion to suppress should, therefore, be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 




C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Any Detention Of Gottardi 
Was Constitutionally Reasonable 
 
“When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence that is alleged to have 
been obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of  
proving that a seizure occurred.”  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 
P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citing State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 
(2004); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 654, 978 P.2d 212, 214 (1999)).  “An 
encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual.”  Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
at 486, 211 P.3d at 95 (citations omitted).  To constitute a seizure, the officer 
must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” in some way restrain an 
individual’s liberty.  Id.  This “requires words or actions, or both, by a law 
enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer 
was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
If this standard is satisfied, the seizure is evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981).  It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30-3(1968).   
Although Gottardi complains he was unlawfully seized, he fails to identify 
at what point he believes an unlawful seizure occurred.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-
13.) There was also a lack of clarity on this point below.  While Gottardi asserted 
in the “statement of facts” section of his memorandum in support of his motion to 
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suppress that he was “illegally detained,” he did not present any argument in his 
memorandum as to the alleged illegality of his detention, but only contended the 
“frisk and search” were illegal.  (R., pp.84-86; see also Tr., p.69, Ls.15-17 (court 
telling prosecutor “you’ve got to start over because now he’s contending that the 
detention itself was unreasonable”), p.83, Ls.3-8 (court noting it was not clear 
from Gottardi’s pleadings whether he was alleging there was an unlawful 
seizure).)  Gottardi did argue at the suppression hearing that he was illegally 
detained, but it was not entirely clear when he contended the detention occurred.  
(Tr., p.68, L.16 – p.69, L.5.)  The district court also indicated that there was no 
evidence Gottardi was seized when Officer Wittmuss first approached because 
there was not “anything on the tape[3] that . . . indicated that Mr. Gottardi was 
required to stay.”  (Tr., p.84, Ls.5-7.)  This observation is consistent with Officer 
Wittmuss’s testimony.  Despite Gottardi’s repeated efforts to get Officer 
Wittmuss to say otherwise, Officer Wittmuss made clear that he did not tell 
Gottardi where to stand when he approached the door – he only told him to “step 
back” from the door.  (Tr., p.17, Ls.16-23, p.34, Ls.16-22, p.53, L.5 – p.54, L.11; 
see also p.79, L.20 – p.80, L.2 (court admonishing counsel that evidence did not 
support his argument that Officer Wittmuss “instructed [Gottardi] to stand in a 
specific spot,” because Officer Wittmuss “clearly testified over and over again . . . 
that he asked him to move back.  He didn’t . . .direct him to a specific spot.  So 
that’s not what happened.  He did not direct him to a specific spot.”).)  Thus, 
                                            




Officer Wittmuss did not seize Gottardi for Fourth Amendment purposes until he 
told him he was going to “pat search” him because it was not until then that 
Officer Wittmuss restricted Gottardi’s movements and Gottardi was not free to 
leave.  The district court correctly concluded this detention was supported by 
reasonable articulable suspicion.   
With respect to the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion, Gottardi 
first contends the court erred because “neither [it] nor Officer Wittmuss could 
articulate what criminal activity Mr. Gottardi was suspected of engaging in.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  This is factually incorrect and legally irrelevant.  
“[R]easonable suspicion does not require a belief that any specific criminal 
activity is afoot to justify an investigative detention.”  State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 
Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis original, citations 
omitted).  “[A]ll that is required is a showing of objective and specific articulable 
facts giving reason to believe that the individual has been or is about to be 
involved in some criminal activity.”  Id. (emphasis original, citations omitted).  
Thus, neither the district court nor Officer Wittmuss were required to “articulate” 
any specific “criminal activity.”  That said, both did.  It was clear from Officer 
Wittmuss’s testimony that he believed, based on his training and experience, 
that Gottardi’s behavior was suspicious for drug activity.  In fact, the district court 
asked him directly what he meant when he characterized Gottardi’s behavior as 
“suspicious,” and he explained: 
Just the lookout behavior, the looking around.  It was odd to me 
that he had walked away from the house and had been driven back 
and dropped off by the house.  As I said, the car dropped him out 
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in the street as opposed to pulling up in front of the residence 
letting him out. 
 
 And I was -- I worked in the Narcotics Unit for several years 
and I know a lot of times dope transactions are done that way, that 
amount -- that quick amount of time where people leave and come 
back and don’t particularly go directly to the house, but are dropped 
off.  Unusual behavior being dropped off out in the street where it 
would be just as easy for the person to pull in right in front of the 
apartment and get out and go inside. 
 
 And, again, like I said the – particularly the lookout type 
behavior of looking down the street and seeing who’s in the 
immediate area as opposed to just casual behavior.   
 
(Tr., p.18, L.15 – p.19, L.14.)  This behavior was also against the backdrop of 
knowledge that Gottardi was going to and from the house of an individual who 
was wanted for two charges for delivery of a controlled substance.  (Tr., p.14, 
Ls.4-8.) 
 The district court made factual findings along these same lines: 
 So what did [Officer Wittmuss] know when [he went to the 
door with Gottardi]?  Well, he knew that Mr. Gottardi obviously 
knew Ms. Green who was a wanted – [one of the] ten most wanted 
people from Nevada and was wanted on a warrant for some sort of 
delivery of a controlled substance and that Mr. Gottardi obviously 
knew her because he was going in and out of the residence 
multiple times.  And, in fact, when he testified, he said that he didn’t 
need to knock.  So obviously he had some familiarity.   
 
 He was also observed for some period of time during that 
time.  And the officer knew that this woman was wanted for drug 
charges.  He observes behavior which raises a suspicion as to 
either Mr. Gottardi and – he sees him consuming alcohol in the late 
afternoon outside of the residence, no testimony as to where in 
proximity, and I don’t really care whether it was in violation of the 
code or not.  But he sees him doing that. 
 
He sees him walk away toward a convenience store, come 




. . . It was Ms. Green’s car that the people were going in and 
out with the -- they were taking material in and out of.  . . .  But he 
sees him dropped off.  He testified that being dropped off in the 
street instead of a more logical place is something that with his 
training he had observed before.   
 
(Tr., p.85, L.19 – p.87, L.1.)  
 Gottardi’s assertion that the evidence did not support a finding of 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, which could include drug 
activity and harboring a fugitive, I.C. § 18-205(2), is belied by the record.4 
 Gottardi also complains that the district court “mistakenly believed that it is 
always reasonable for officers to detain nearby individuals when they execute an 
arrest warrant.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12 (citing Tr., p.87, Ls.8-14).)  Gottardi 
acknowledges that “such precedent exists where officers execute a search 
warrant,” but claims “that precedent does not apply where officers execute an 
arrest warrant.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  Gottardi is correct regarding the 
existence of precedent in the context of search warrants, but incorrect in his 
conclusion that such precedent should not extend to arrest warrants.  
  “In the execution of a search warrant for drugs or contraband at a 
residence, it is lawful for police to detain, during the duration of the search, those 
                                            
4 Gottardi contends Officer Wittmuss could not have reasonable suspicion of 
harboring a fugitive because the officer “had no information that would support a 
conclusion that he knew Ms. Green had an active arrest warrant from Nevada, 
let alone that he was harboring a known fugitive.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  The 
reasonable suspicion standard does not require evidence of actual knowledge – 
it only requires “specific articulable facts which justify suspicion.”  State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).  Gottardi’s 
behavior and his obvious personal relationship with Green, in conjunction with 
the fact Green was wanted on a warrant for drug crimes, are specific articulable 
facts that justify suspicion that Gottardi, in addition to being involved in drug 
activity, had knowledge of Green’s status and was harboring her.    
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individuals who are occupants of the residence.”  State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 
911, 914, 155 P.3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 705; 
State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 646, 51 P.3d 457, 460 (Ct. App. 2002)).  
“Similarly, individuals found on the premises at the inception of the search whose 
identity and connection to the premises are unknown may be detained for the 
time necessary to determine those facts and to protect the safety of those 
present during the detention.”  Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 914, 155 P.3d at 715 
(citing Kester, 137 Idaho at 646, 51 P.3d at 460; State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 
300, 47 P.3d 1266, 1270 (Ct. App. 2002)).   
The district court accurately noted the foregoing legal principle in 
considering Gottardi’s suppression motion and factored it in to its conclusion that 
Gottardi was lawfully detained.  Gottardi contends that the rationale allowing for 
the temporary detention of individuals on the premises at the inception of a 
search pursuant to a warrant does not apply in the context of arrest warrants 
because an arrest warrant “provides no justification to seize anyone other than 
the subject of the arrest warrant.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.)  Gottardi’s argument 
is unpersuasive because it draws a distinction without a difference and ignores 
the standard by which all seizures are to be judged under the Fourth 
Amendment, i.e. “the ultimate standard of reasonableness.”  Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 699-700. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of any seizure, the court must “balance 
the extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it, looking in 
the final and dispositive portion of the analysis to the individualized and objective 
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facts that made those interests applicable in the circumstances of the particular 
detention.”  People v. Glaser, 902 P.2d 729, 734 (Cal. 1995) (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21; Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); accord State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90, 
95, 996 P.2d 309, 314 (Ct. App. 1999).  Although Summers involved the 
detention of individuals during the execution of a search warrant for contraband, 
neither that case or any Idaho case decided after it requires the existence of a 
search warrant for contraband as a prerequisite to finding the detention of an 
individual to be reasonable.  Rather,  the existence of a search warrant “is but 
one factor the courts consider when determining the governmental interest 
involved.”  People v. Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 806, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  
Other factors to be considered include “the interest in minimizing the risk of harm 
to the officers” and the facilitation of “the orderly completion” of the officers’ task.  
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03.  Just as “the execution of a warrant to search for 
narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or 
frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence,” Id., the execution of an arrest 
warrant at a residence occupied by several individuals likewise raises concerns 
for officer safety.  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990) 
(acknowledging risks of danger associated with in-home arrests, including 
presence of other potentially dangerous individuals).  In such situations, “[t]he 
risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers 
routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”  Summers, 452 U.S. 
at 702-03 (citation omitted). 
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In recognition of the foregoing principles, many courts that have 
considered the issue have “concluded that officers entering a residence to 
execute an arrest warrant may constitutionally detain the occupants of the 
residence for the period of time necessary to safely effectuate the arrest.”  
Adams v. Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing United 
States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 330 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); Cherrington v. Skeeter, 
344 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Enslin, 327 F.3d 788, 797, 
n.32 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also, e.g., Way v. State, 101 P.3d 203, 206-09 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2004); Hannah, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 811-12; State v. Valdez, 69 P.3d 
1052, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).  As aptly explained by one federal district 
court, such limited detentions are justified when balanced against the legitimate 
governmental interest in officer safety: 
[D]espite whatever precautions might be taken, it is inevitable that 
some potentially dangerous police activities will occur among 
private citizens. These private citizens, while wholly innocent 
bystanders, often may introduce additional variables at a time when 
the primary and legitimate goal of the police is to secure control of 
the situation.  Failure to gain complete control of the situation may 
endanger the success of the police operation, as well as the safety 
of the innocent bystanders and law enforcement officers.  Thus, 
police have a strong interest in securing the arrest scene, including 
if necessary the temporary detention of third persons who may be 
present. 
 
Croom v. Balkwill, 672 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting 
Thompson v. City of Lawrence, 1994 WL 262598 at *10 (D. Kan. 1994)).  
Because police officers executing arrest warrants frequently encounter the same 
dangers faced by officers executing search warrants, this Court should hold, 
consistent with other jurisdictions that have considered the issue, that “police 
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have the limited authority to briefly detain those on the scene, even wholly 
innocent bystanders, as they execute a search or arrest warrant.”  Cherrington, 
344 F.3d at 638 (citations omitted). 
Applying the above legal principles, and testing Gottardi’s detention 
against the “ultimate standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment,” Summers, 452 U.S. at 699-700, it is clear that Officer Wittmuss’s 
act of temporarily detaining Gottardi while the officers executed the arrest 
warrant for Green was constitutionally reasonable.  As Officer Wittmuss 
explained, the situation “escalated very quickly” once Green opened the door, 
and Gottardi remained in close proximity to Officer Wittmuss even after Officer 
Wittmuss told him to “back off.”  (Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.23.)  After Officer 
Wittmuss was able to turn his attention to Gottardi, Officer Wittmuss asked him if 
he had any weapons, and Gottardi admitted he had a “pocket knife.”  (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.5-7, p.20, Ls.14-20.)  Officer Wittmuss also testified that, in his training and 
experience, individuals who are present when an arrest warrant is being served 
“sometimes cause problems for law enforcement.”  (Tr., p.19, Ls.20-24.)  This is 
particularly concerning where, as here, the individual being arrested is “very 
emotional” as such behavior “usually tends to amp up the other people” who are 
“at the immediate scene.”  (Tr., p.20, Ls.6-13.)  In light of the risks he faced and 
law enforcement’s legitimate interest in safely and expeditiously executing the 
arrest warrant, there can be little doubt that Officer Wittmuss was justified in 
“excercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation,” Summers, 452 U.S. at 
702-03, including by briefly detaining Gottardi “for the period of time necessary to 
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safely effectuate [Green’s] arrest,” Adams, 17 F.Supp.3d at 502 (citations 
omitted).   
 Gottardi next argues that the “pat search” was unlawful because, he 
contends, none of the “facts surrounding the encounter . . . support an 
objectively reasonable belief that [he] was a danger to anyone.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.13.)  Application of the correct law to the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing shows otherwise.   
 Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for “an 
officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order 
to remove any weapons.”  State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21 
(2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).  
Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the 
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality 
of the circumstances.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations 
and citation omitted).  The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the 
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).  The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that 
“[a] person can be armed without posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere 
knowledge that an individual has a weapon is insufficient to justify a frisk; there 
must also be a basis for concluding the armed individual is dangerous.  Henage, 
143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21.  “Several factors influence whether a 
reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular 
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person was armed and dangerous.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 
P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).  The factors include whether:  (1) “there were any 
bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter 
took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3) “the individual made threatening 
or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated that he or she possessed a 
weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or 
illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the 
individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“Whether any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are 
enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Id.    
 Applying this standard to the evidence presented, the district court found 
the frisk of Gottardi was lawful.  (Tr., p.87, L.24 – p.93, L.12.)  The district court 
cited the following facts in support of its conclusion:  (1) Gottardi was nervous; 
(2) Gottardi “appeared to be acting as a lookout”; (3) Gottardi had been 
consuming alcohol; (4) when Officer Wittmuss encountered Gottardi, Gottardi 
was “slow and lethargic,” which “may suggest that at some point he may not be 
making rational[] decisions and may become more dangerous because he is 
drinking”; (5) Gottardi did not respond when Officer Wittmuss first addressed 
him; (6) Gottardi had been spending time with Green who was “in the top ten 
most wanted individuals from Nevada”; (7) it was “starting to get dusk”; (8) 
Gottardi “is over six foot tall”; (9) Gottardi did not “step back much” when Officer 
Wittmuss asked him to, but instead Gottardi stayed “in close proximity” to Officer 
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Wittmuss; (10) the scene became “chaotic” when Green answered the door; (11) 
Gottardi admitted he had a knife; and (12) Officer Wittmuss was unfamiliar with 
Gottardi and, therefore, did not know whether he had a history of being 
cooperative with law enforcement.  (Tr., p.88, L.25 – p.93, L.5.)  Based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the district court correctly concluded “any rational[] 
person from an objective standpoint would believe that a frisk was necessary in 
order to ensure the individual did not have any weapons especially because he 
still hadn’t retrieved the weapon at that point.”  (Tr., p.93, Ls.6-10.)  
 On appeal, Gottardi argues that “[t]he facts surrounding the encounter do 
not objectively demonstrate that [he] was a danger to anyone at the time Officer 
Wittmuss laid his hands upon him” since Gottardi “made no furtive movements or 
threatening statements” and because he allegedly “complied with Officer 
Wittmuss’ commands” and “was cooperative.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.14.)  The 
absence of “furtive movements or threatening statements” is not, however, 
dispositive because the applicable standard requires the court to consider the 
totality of the circumstances; the existence of “furtive movements or threatening 
statements” is just one factor of many that are relevant to the analysis.  Bishop, 
146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218.  The circumstances present in this case, 
which the district court identified, would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 
P.3d at 21 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Further, Gottardi’s claim that he “complied” and “was cooperative” is not 
entirely accurate.  Indeed, the district court addressed this very assertion, noting 
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Gottardi’s lack of response when Officer Wittmuss identified himself and the 
reason he was there.  (Tr., p.90, Ls.14-17.)  As noted by the district court, while 
Gottardi’s reaction was not “combative,” it was also not cooperative.  (Tr., p.90, 
Ls.17-19.)  The district court also noted  the fact that, when Officer Wittmuss told 
Gottardi to step back, “he didn’t step back very much” but remained in “close 
proximity” to Officer Wittmuss.  (Tr., p.90, L.20 – p.91, L.16.) 
Gottardi’s behavior in this case is easily distinguishable from the 
“cooperative” behavior the Court found significant in Henage.  In Henage, the 
Court found the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Henage 
because the officer testified he knew Henage from prior encounters, had always 
known him to be “polite” and “cooperative,” which was consistent with Henage’s 
behavior during the particular encounter at issue, and that, although Henage told 
the officer he had a knife on him, the officer returned the knife, which was a 
Leatherman, to Henage after being made aware of its presence.  Id. at 661-662, 
152 P.3d at 22-23.  Unlike in Henage, Officer Wittmuss had no such experience 
with Gottardi that would defeat the factors justifying a pat search.  The district 
court’s factual findings, which Gottardi does not challenge, support the district 
court’s conclusion that the pat search was justified.   
Gottardi has failed to establish any error in the denial of his suppression 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
denial of Gottardi’s motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 21st day of March, 2016. 
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